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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE RF.VIEW
A CONTEMPORARY POLITICAi, DILEMMA: THE IMPACT OF
INTM.LIGl•\NCE OPERATIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY
by
Lieutenant Commander James T. Westwood, U.S. Navy

Wiiliam E. Colby, the former
Director of Central Intelligence, has said
that intelligence will not work if ex•
posed. He is quite correct. Exposures
and exposes which reveal sources,
methods, and degrees of accomplish·
ment are fundamentally damaging in the
long term and are critically detrimental
operations undertaken to influence the
to states' interests and policies. That is
course of events 1 sometimes called
why such acts are forbidden by and
clandestine or covert operations. AH
se verely punishable under law, One
three kinds of intelligence operations
will have an impact on foreign policy.
ma rvels at any group or individual who
seriously supposes that a state and its
This impact w ill vary in both scope and
leadership will forego an opportunity to
degree1 because it is policy which gives
further what it regards to be its interests
rise to intelligence operations.
or 1 generally 1 hesitate to defend those
In the a ffairs of politically organized
mankind, there is a ladder of actions
interests and policies. P.fter all, men
organize collectively for protection
which commences with variegated,
against common enemies and for the
often amorphous qualities that have
promotion of a concept of their welfare 1
come to be called national interests. In
turn, the element of policy gives a
i.e., the furtherance of their interests, In
so doing they elaborate policies to
certain form and direction to national
promote their interests. Intelligence
interests, and from policy comes a
scheme or plan of action which is
operations of all types are essential and
integt·al to this process, and lt is nothing
strategy. Strategy, in its turn, is imple
short of amazing t hat governments,
mented by one or more tactics. Thus,
intelligence operations are really tactics.
their critics, and their populations at
large regularly lose sight of th ese funda
There is little or nothing in this view
that is mysterious and even less j if
mental conditions and prnmises, To
anything, that is unreasonable. Where
argue that intelligence operations can be
there is no policy, there hardly will be
abrogated or suspended is tantamount
to expecting that men, organized for
any strategy-•0r tactics. Where p olicy is
political and social purposes have no
large and encompassing, it must natu
rally be expected that intelligence
interests. Intelligence operations are as
operations will occur, That these opera•
old as organized man and as new as the
tions exist and flo urish will not be a
most current demands made on them.
secret. Indeed, it will be a matter of the
Though sometimes seemingly ind•·
pendent, they fall closely in line with
widest public awareness. Only certain
the patterns of behavior and the values
sources, certain d etailed methods, and
of peoples and their governments.
the degrees of relative success, it is to be
hoped-and
expected-will
be
secret.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1977The contemporary confusion that 1
Intelligence operations fall into three
broad categories: ( 1) those by which
1
'raw" data are collected, processed into
"finished" information1 and dissemi
nated; (2) those conducted to counter•
intelligence operations, of whatever
kind, of rivals; and (3) those intelligence
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